A Comprehensive Assessment of the Legacy of Pierre Dorion

It’s understandable that in the minds of many, Pierre Dorion’s time with the Ottawa Senators is synonymous with the instability and incoherence of then-owner Eugene Melnyk. He remains best known for being trotted out in front of media with no support or preparation, where he gifted us with quotes like “we’re a team,” claiming trading Mark Stone was his proudest day, claiming that players were hugging him after he acquired Burrows, and re-enacting the trade call for DeBrincat with his phone screen still activated, revealing the call wasn’t happening.

We’re far enough away now from Dorion’s firing in 2023 to look back on his time as General Manager of the Ottawa Senators with some semblance of objectivity, or at least untraumatized curiosity. To that end, this post attempts to rank and produce an average of every transaction – every signing and trade – conducted by Dorion, and to compare his record against others. At the time of his firing, Dorion was the seventh-longest serving GM among the NHL’s 32 teams. He wasn’t a bridge from one era to the next, but an era unto himself, for better or for worse. That in itself implies a record worthy of examination.

The standard verdict on Dorion is that he took over in April 2016, reached double overtime of Game 7 in the 2017 Eastern Conference Final, then missed the playoffs six straight years and was fired in November 2023. In what is relentlessly referred to as a results-based business, that could be the whole story. But the club was rebuilding, and the owner was broke. That’s lazy storytelling.

In hindsight, what my totally scientific and objectively correct analysis reveals is that Pierre Dorion’s decisions – his process – as Ottawa Senators General Manager from 2016-2023 were better than their outcomes, though obviously not by enough to rescue his reputation. That is the conclusion from grading every significant move he made twice. This piece separates the two questions into process and outcome. Each of 86 moves gets a process score (was it reasonable to expect this to work, given what was known that day?) and a results score (did it work?). Both are out of five, and both are my own reckoning, not a formula.

The list covers NHL-level trades, signings, extensions, waiver claims and buyouts. It leaves out entry-level contracts, draft selections and minor-league deals. Three non-transactions are included because they carried the weight of one: the 2017 expansion protection list, the choice of which first-round pick to send Colorado, and leaving Shane Pinto unsigned in 2023. (Yes, his draft record is a large part of his legacy, and a part for another post.)

The headline numbers

Dorion averages 3.1 out of 5 on process and 2.7 on results. Hindsight lowers the score on 37 of the 86 moves, raises it on 9, and leaves 40 unchanged.

A 3.1 is a middling grade: more defensible decisions than indefensible ones, with few that were inspired. The 0.4 drop says his luck ran slightly bad, not catastrophically so.

SeasonMovesProcess avgResults avg
2016–17113.12.6
2017–18113.12.9
2018–1993.02.6
2019–20103.32.9
2020–21163.12.7
2021–2292.92.8
2022–23133.42.9
2023 offseason72.72.3
Total863.12.7

No season’s results beat its process. His strongest process year, 2022–23, was the summer of DeBrincat and Giroux. His weakest was his last.

What he did well

Locking up the core. Chabot, Tkachuk, Batherson, Stützle and Sanderson all signed long-term deals that scored 4 or 5 on both scales. Add the Giroux signing and this group averages well above 4. Whatever the Senators become, the spine of the team was established by Dorion.

Selling at the deadline. He got a second-round pick for Curtis Lazar, a first and a goalie prospect for Derick Brassard, Anthony Duclair and two seconds for Ryan Dzingel, and a first, second and third for Jean-Gabriel Pageau. When he had an expiring asset and a seller’s market, he consistently got full price.

Finding cheap value. Artem Zub out of the KHL, Anton Forsberg off waivers, Mike Condon for a fifth-round pick, and Connor Brown as the sweetener in a salary swap were all low-cost moves that returned real NHL minutes.

Where the process itself failed

These are the moves that scored 1 or 2 before a puck was dropped. Bad luck does not explain them.

Paying real assets for veteran depth. Jonathan Dahlen for Alex Burrows, plus a two-year extension. A third-round pick for Travis Hamonic. A second for Derek Stepan. Two years for Michael Del Zotto. Each spent futures or term on a declining player the team did not need.

Goaltending. Three years for Condon after one good run. A trade and $25 million for Matt Murray coming off a poor season. Filip Gustavsson for an aging Cam Talbot. Five years for Joonas Korpisalo. He never got this position right, and the warning signs were visible each time.

Paying to undo his own work. Moving Murray cost retained salary and two picks. Moving Nikita Zaitsev cost a second and a fourth. Colin White’s six-year deal ended in a buyout. These score poorly twice: once when signed, once when erased.

Asset management. Duclair was let go for nothing after a 23-goal season. Mark Stone was walked to within months of free agency. The Dadonov trade drew a draft-pick penalty from the league over an undisclosed no-trade list. Pinto began 2023–24 unsigned because there was no cap room left for him.

Good bets that lost, bad bets that won

The gap between the two scores lives mostly in six moves that dropped two points each.

  • Duchene to Columbus (4 to 2). A first-round pick and two prospects was a fair return. None of them became NHL regulars.
  • DeBrincat acquisition (4 to 2). A 41-goal scorer for a seventh-overall pick was a reasonable swing. He stayed one season.
  • Chychrun trade (4 to 2). The price was fair for a top-pair defenceman on a cheap contract. The fit never came.
  • Dadonov signing (4 to 2). Good value on paper, ordinary on the ice.
  • Stone to Vegas (3 to 1). Erik Brannstrom was a legitimately prized prospect. He did not become the player Ottawa needed.
  • Trading up for Logan Brown (3 to 1). A defensible draft-floor move for a pick that missed.

Two moves ran the other way, and they are the two that matter most.

  • The Karlsson trade (3 to 5). Panned at the time as a quantity-over-quality return. The unprotected first became Tim Stützle, and Josh Norris came in the same package.
  • Keeping the 2018 first-round pick (2 to 4). Owing Colorado an unprotected 2019 first while tearing the roster down was reckless. It produced Brady Tkachuk.

Dorion’s most important successes came from his shakiest reasoning, and his soundest reasoning on acquired talent mostly failed.

The verdict

Dorion was a better general manager than his record, but still not a good enough one to recover his reputation.

The case for him is real. He assembled and signed a young core that any successor would be glad to inherit, and he was a reliably sharp seller. On process alone he grades as roughly league-average.

The case against him is that his errors were repeated, not random. He misjudged goaltenders for seven years. He kept spending picks on fading veterans. He let good players leave for nothing, and the procedural lapses at the end were unforced. A general manager can survive bad luck on big swings. It is harder to defend making the same avoidable mistake five times.

His legacy is a core worth building around, handed over with very little around it.

The full ledger

All 86 moves by season. Process is the score on the day. Result is the score in hindsight. Contract figures are approximate annual values.

2016–17

MoveProcessResult
Trade up to 11th overall for Logan Brown31
Zibanejad + 2nd for Brassard21
Hoffman, 4 years x $5.19M44
Ceci, 2-year bridge32
Chris Kelly, 1 year33
Condon for a 5th45
Wingels trade32
Zack Smith, 4 x $3.25M32
Dahlen for Burrows, plus 2-year extension11
Stalberg for a 3rd33
Lazar for a 2nd55

2017–18

MoveProcessResult
Expansion protection list (lost Methot)23
Condon, 3 x $2.4M21
Pageau, 3 x $3.1M45
Dzingel, 2 x $1.8M45
Nate Thompson, 2 x $1.65M22
Oduya, 1 year32
Anderson extension at 36, 2 x $4.75M22
Duchene trade (Turris, Bowers, 1st, 3rd)21
Phaneuf to Los Angeles for Gaborik44
Brassard to Pittsburgh (Gustavsson, 1st, 3rd)54
Cole flipped for a 3rd43

2018–19

MoveProcessResult
Hoffman to San Jose21
Keeping the 2018 1st, owing Colorado the 2019 1st24
Stone, 1 year to free agency21
Ceci, 1 x $4.3M32
Karlsson trade35
Nilsson trade33
Duchene to Columbus42
Dzingel for Duclair + two 2nds54
Stone to Vegas31

2019–20

MoveProcessResult
Ceci for Zaitsev and Connor Brown33
Zack Smith for Anisimov33
Hainsey, 1 year33
Ennis, 1 year44
Colin White, 6 x $4.75M21
Chabot, 8 x $8M44
Nilsson, 2 x $2.6M32
Namestnikov in and out33
Pageau to Islanders (1st, 2nd, 3rd)54
DeMelo for a 3rd32

2020–21

MoveProcessResult
Bobby Ryan buyout33
Duclair not qualified11
Murray trade + 4 x $6.25M21
Dadonov, 3 x $5M42
Zub signed from the KHL55
Connor Brown, 3 x $3.6M45
Tierney, 2 x $3.5M32
Gudbranson for a 5th22
Josh Brown for a 4th22
Watson for a 4th33
Stepan for a 2nd21
Coburn, Paquette + 2nd for dead contracts43
Galchenyuk, 1 year32
Forsberg waiver claim55
Deadline sales (Reilly, Gudbranson, Coburn)33
Mete waiver claim43

2021–22

MoveProcessResult
Dadonov to Vegas, no-trade list not passed on11
Del Zotto, 2 x $2M11
Batherson, 6 x $4.975M55
Tkachuk, 7 x $8.2M55
Zub, 2 x $2.5M45
Logan Brown for Sanford33
Forsberg, 3 x $2.75M32
Paul for Joseph + 4th32
Hamonic for a 3rd11

2022–23

MoveProcessResult
DeBrincat for 7th overall, a 2nd and a 3rd42
Giroux, 3 x $6.5M55
Norris, 8 x $7.95M32
Murray dump to Toronto33
Gustavsson for Talbot21
Connor Brown for a 2nd44
Colin White buyout33
Stützle, 8 x $8.35M55
Joseph, 4 x $2.95M22
Motte signed, then flipped33
Zub, 4 x $4.6M44
Zaitsev dump (cost a 2nd + 4th)22
Chychrun trade42

2023 offseason

MoveProcessResult
DeBrincat to Detroit32
Korpisalo, 5 x $4M21
Tarasenko, 1 x $5M43
Hamonic, 2 x $1.1M21
Sanderson, 8 x $8.05M45
Brannstrom, 1 x $2M33
Pinto left unsigned for lack of cap room11

For comparison’s sake, let’s look at Joe Sakic, widely considered a very successful GM over the same period of time.

Sakic averages 3.4 on process and 3.3 on results across 63 moves, against Dorion’s 3.1 and 2.7. His results nearly match his process, where Dorion’s fell well short.

I’ve counted from summer 2014 through the 2022 Cup, though Patrick Roy shared control of personnel until August 2016. The average hides two very different GMs:

EraMovesProcessResults
2014–16 (with Roy)142.32.2
2016–22493.73.6

Scores below are process / result.

2014–15

  • Stastny lost to free agency: 2 / 2
  • Iginla at 37, 3 years x $5.33M: 2 / 3
  • Parenteau + 5th for Briere: 1 / 1
  • Brad Stuart trade + extension: 1 / 1
  • O’Reilly, 2 x $6M: 3 / 3
  • Barrie bridge deal: 4 / 4

2015–16

  • O’Reilly to Buffalo: 3 / 2
  • Soderberg, 5 x $4.75M: 2 / 3
  • Beauchemin at 35, 3 x $4.5M: 2 / 2
  • Comeau, 3 x $2.4M: 3 / 3
  • Erik Johnson, 7 x $6M: 3 / 3
  • Boedker rental: 2 / 1
  • Matthias rental: 2 / 2
  • Gelinas for a 3rd: 2 / 1

2016–17

  • MacKinnon, 7 x $6.3M: 5 / 5
  • Barrie, 4 x $5.5M: 4 / 4
  • Colborne, 2 x $2.5M: 3 / 1
  • Tyutin and Wiercioch, 1 year each: 3 / 2
  • Holding Duchene and Landeskog at the deadline: 4 / 5
  • Iginla to LA: 3 / 3
  • Andrighetto for Martinsen: 4 / 4
  • Barberio waiver claim: 4 / 3
  • Nieto waiver claim: 4 / 4

2017–18

  • Colin Wilson for a 4th: 3 / 2
  • Bernier, 1 year: 4 / 4
  • Yakupov, 1 year: 3 / 2
  • Zadorov, 2 years: 3 / 3
  • Kerfoot signed as college free agent: 5 / 4
  • Duchene trade: 5 / 5
  • Nemeth waiver claim: 4 / 4

2018–19

  • Grubauer trade + 3-year deal: 4 / 4
  • Ian Cole, 3 x $4.25M: 3 / 3
  • Calvert, 3 x $2.8M: 3 / 3
  • Brassard rental: 3 / 2

2019–20

  • Barrie + Kerfoot for Kadri: 4 / 5
  • Soderberg salary dump: 3 / 3
  • Burakovsky for a 2nd + 3rd: 5 / 5
  • Donskoi, 4 x $3.9M: 4 / 4
  • Bellemare, 2 years: 3 / 3
  • Nichushkin, 1 year at $850K: 5 / 5
  • Rantanen, 6 x $9.25M: 4 / 5
  • Compher, 4 x $3.5M: 3 / 3
  • Girard, 7 x $5M: 4 / 3
  • Francouz signing + extension: 4 / 3
  • Namestnikov rental: 3 / 3

2020–21

  • Toews for two 2nds, 4 x $4.1M: 5 / 5
  • Saad for Zadorov: 4 / 3
  • Burakovsky, 2 x $4.9M: 4 / 4
  • Graves, 3 years: 3 / 3
  • Nichushkin, 2 x $2.5M: 4 / 5
  • Dubnyk rental: 3 / 2
  • Nemeth and Soderberg depth rentals: 3 / 2

2021–22

  • Makar, 6 x $9M: 5 / 5
  • Landeskog, 8 x $7M: 3 / 2
  • Letting Grubauer walk: 3 / 5
  • Kuemper for Timmins, 1st + 3rd: 3 / 5
  • Graves to New Jersey: 4 / 3
  • Helm, 1 year: 3 / 4
  • MacDermid for a 4th: 2 / 2
  • Jost for Sturm: 3 / 3
  • Manson rental: 4 / 4
  • Lehkonen trade: 4 / 5
  • Cogliano for a 5th: 4 / 4

Early Sakic was worse than Dorion ever was, making the same mistake of paying for aging veterans. The difference is that he stopped: after 2016 he has only one move below a 3 on process, and his 5s came from buying undervalued players in their prime (Toews, Burakovsky, Nichushkin, Kadri).

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