A Comprehensive Assessment of the Legacy of Pierre Dorion

It’s understandable that in the minds of many, Pierre Dorion’s time with the Ottawa Senators is synonymous with the instability and incoherence of then-owner Eugene Melnyk. He remains best known for being trotted out in front of media with no support or preparation, where he gifted us with quotes like “we’re a team,” claiming trading Mark Stone was his proudest day, claiming that players were hugging him after he acquired Burrows, and re-enacting the trade call for DeBrincat with his phone screen still activated, revealing the call wasn’t happening.

We’re far enough away now from Dorion’s firing in 2023 to look back on his time as General Manager of the Ottawa Senators with some semblance of objectivity, or at least untraumatized curiosity. To that end, this post attempts to rank and produce an average of every transaction – every signing and trade – conducted by Dorion, and to compare his record against others. At the time of his firing, Dorion was the seventh-longest serving GM among the NHL’s 32 teams. He wasn’t a bridge from one era to the next, but an era unto himself, for better or for worse. That in itself implies a record worthy of examination.

The standard verdict on Dorion is that he took over in April 2016, reached double overtime of Game 7 in the 2017 Eastern Conference Final, then missed the playoffs six straight years and was fired in November 2023. In what is relentlessly referred to as a results-based business, that could be the whole story. But the club was rebuilding, and the owner was broke. That’s lazy storytelling.

In hindsight, what my totally scientific and objectively correct analysis reveals is that Pierre Dorion’s decisions – his process – as Ottawa Senators General Manager from 2016-2023 were better than their outcomes, though obviously not by enough to rescue his reputation. That is the conclusion from grading every significant move he made twice. This piece separates the two questions into process and outcome. Each of 86 moves gets a process score (was it reasonable to expect this to work, given what was known that day?) and a results score (did it work?). Both are out of five, and both are my own reckoning, not a formula.

The list covers NHL-level trades, signings, extensions, waiver claims and buyouts. It leaves out entry-level contracts, draft selections and minor-league deals. Three non-transactions are included because they carried the weight of one: the 2017 expansion protection list, the choice of which first-round pick to send Colorado, and leaving Shane Pinto unsigned in 2023. (Yes, his draft record is a large part of his legacy, and a part for another post.)

The headline numbers

Dorion averages 3.1 out of 5 on process and 2.7 on results. Hindsight lowers the score on 37 of the 86 moves, raises it on 9, and leaves 40 unchanged.

A 3.1 is a middling grade: more defensible decisions than indefensible ones, with few that were inspired. The 0.4 drop says his luck ran slightly bad, not catastrophically so.

SeasonMovesProcess avgResults avg
2016–17113.12.6
2017–18113.12.9
2018–1993.02.6
2019–20103.32.9
2020–21163.12.7
2021–2292.92.8
2022–23133.42.9
2023 offseason72.72.3
Total863.12.7

No season’s results beat its process. His strongest process year, 2022–23, was the summer of DeBrincat and Giroux. His weakest was his last.

What he did well

Locking up the core. Chabot, Tkachuk, Batherson, Stützle and Sanderson all signed long-term deals that scored 4 or 5 on both scales. Add the Giroux signing and this group averages well above 4. Whatever the Senators become, the spine of the team was established by Dorion.

Selling at the deadline. He got a second-round pick for Curtis Lazar, a first and a goalie prospect for Derick Brassard, Anthony Duclair and two seconds for Ryan Dzingel, and a first, second and third for Jean-Gabriel Pageau. When he had an expiring asset and a seller’s market, he consistently got full price.

Finding cheap value. Artem Zub out of the KHL, Anton Forsberg off waivers, Mike Condon for a fifth-round pick, and Connor Brown as the sweetener in a salary swap were all low-cost moves that returned real NHL minutes.

Where the process itself failed

These are the moves that scored 1 or 2 before a puck was dropped. Bad luck does not explain them.

Paying real assets for veteran depth. Jonathan Dahlen for Alex Burrows, plus a two-year extension. A third-round pick for Travis Hamonic. A second for Derek Stepan. Two years for Michael Del Zotto. Each spent futures or term on a declining player the team did not need.

Goaltending. Three years for Condon after one good run. A trade and $25 million for Matt Murray coming off a poor season. Filip Gustavsson for an aging Cam Talbot. Five years for Joonas Korpisalo. He never got this position right, and the warning signs were visible each time.

Paying to undo his own work. Moving Murray cost retained salary and two picks. Moving Nikita Zaitsev cost a second and a fourth. Colin White’s six-year deal ended in a buyout. These score poorly twice: once when signed, once when erased.

Asset management. Duclair was let go for nothing after a 23-goal season. Mark Stone was walked to within months of free agency. The Dadonov trade drew a draft-pick penalty from the league over an undisclosed no-trade list. Pinto began 2023–24 unsigned because there was no cap room left for him.

Good bets that lost, bad bets that won

The gap between the two scores lives mostly in six moves that dropped two points each.

  • Duchene to Columbus (4 to 2). A first-round pick and two prospects was a fair return. None of them became NHL regulars.
  • DeBrincat acquisition (4 to 2). A 41-goal scorer for a seventh-overall pick was a reasonable swing. He stayed one season.
  • Chychrun trade (4 to 2). The price was fair for a top-pair defenceman on a cheap contract. The fit never came.
  • Dadonov signing (4 to 2). Good value on paper, ordinary on the ice.
  • Stone to Vegas (3 to 1). Erik Brannstrom was a legitimately prized prospect. He did not become the player Ottawa needed.
  • Trading up for Logan Brown (3 to 1). A defensible draft-floor move for a pick that missed.

Two moves ran the other way, and they are the two that matter most.

  • The Karlsson trade (3 to 5). Panned at the time as a quantity-over-quality return. The unprotected first became Tim Stützle, and Josh Norris came in the same package.
  • Keeping the 2018 first-round pick (2 to 4). Owing Colorado an unprotected 2019 first while tearing the roster down was reckless. It produced Brady Tkachuk.

Dorion’s most important successes came from his shakiest reasoning, and his soundest reasoning on acquired talent mostly failed.

The verdict

Dorion was a better general manager than his record, but still not a good enough one to recover his reputation.

The case for him is real. He assembled and signed a young core that any successor would be glad to inherit, and he was a reliably sharp seller. On process alone he grades as roughly league-average.

The case against him is that his errors were repeated, not random. He misjudged goaltenders for seven years. He kept spending picks on fading veterans. He let good players leave for nothing, and the procedural lapses at the end were unforced. A general manager can survive bad luck on big swings. It is harder to defend making the same avoidable mistake five times.

His legacy is a core worth building around, handed over with very little around it.

The full ledger

All 86 moves by season. Process is the score on the day. Result is the score in hindsight. Contract figures are approximate annual values.

2016–17

MoveProcessResult
Trade up to 11th overall for Logan Brown31
Zibanejad + 2nd for Brassard21
Hoffman, 4 years x $5.19M44
Ceci, 2-year bridge32
Chris Kelly, 1 year33
Condon for a 5th45
Wingels trade32
Zack Smith, 4 x $3.25M32
Dahlen for Burrows, plus 2-year extension11
Stalberg for a 3rd33
Lazar for a 2nd55

2017–18

MoveProcessResult
Expansion protection list (lost Methot)23
Condon, 3 x $2.4M21
Pageau, 3 x $3.1M45
Dzingel, 2 x $1.8M45
Nate Thompson, 2 x $1.65M22
Oduya, 1 year32
Anderson extension at 36, 2 x $4.75M22
Duchene trade (Turris, Bowers, 1st, 3rd)21
Phaneuf to Los Angeles for Gaborik44
Brassard to Pittsburgh (Gustavsson, 1st, 3rd)54
Cole flipped for a 3rd43

2018–19

MoveProcessResult
Hoffman to San Jose21
Keeping the 2018 1st, owing Colorado the 2019 1st24
Stone, 1 year to free agency21
Ceci, 1 x $4.3M32
Karlsson trade35
Nilsson trade33
Duchene to Columbus42
Dzingel for Duclair + two 2nds54
Stone to Vegas31

2019–20

MoveProcessResult
Ceci for Zaitsev and Connor Brown33
Zack Smith for Anisimov33
Hainsey, 1 year33
Ennis, 1 year44
Colin White, 6 x $4.75M21
Chabot, 8 x $8M44
Nilsson, 2 x $2.6M32
Namestnikov in and out33
Pageau to Islanders (1st, 2nd, 3rd)54
DeMelo for a 3rd32

2020–21

MoveProcessResult
Bobby Ryan buyout33
Duclair not qualified11
Murray trade + 4 x $6.25M21
Dadonov, 3 x $5M42
Zub signed from the KHL55
Connor Brown, 3 x $3.6M45
Tierney, 2 x $3.5M32
Gudbranson for a 5th22
Josh Brown for a 4th22
Watson for a 4th33
Stepan for a 2nd21
Coburn, Paquette + 2nd for dead contracts43
Galchenyuk, 1 year32
Forsberg waiver claim55
Deadline sales (Reilly, Gudbranson, Coburn)33
Mete waiver claim43

2021–22

MoveProcessResult
Dadonov to Vegas, no-trade list not passed on11
Del Zotto, 2 x $2M11
Batherson, 6 x $4.975M55
Tkachuk, 7 x $8.2M55
Zub, 2 x $2.5M45
Logan Brown for Sanford33
Forsberg, 3 x $2.75M32
Paul for Joseph + 4th32
Hamonic for a 3rd11

2022–23

MoveProcessResult
DeBrincat for 7th overall, a 2nd and a 3rd42
Giroux, 3 x $6.5M55
Norris, 8 x $7.95M32
Murray dump to Toronto33
Gustavsson for Talbot21
Connor Brown for a 2nd44
Colin White buyout33
Stützle, 8 x $8.35M55
Joseph, 4 x $2.95M22
Motte signed, then flipped33
Zub, 4 x $4.6M44
Zaitsev dump (cost a 2nd + 4th)22
Chychrun trade42

2023 offseason

MoveProcessResult
DeBrincat to Detroit32
Korpisalo, 5 x $4M21
Tarasenko, 1 x $5M43
Hamonic, 2 x $1.1M21
Sanderson, 8 x $8.05M45
Brannstrom, 1 x $2M33
Pinto left unsigned for lack of cap room11

For comparison’s sake, let’s look at Joe Sakic, widely considered a very successful GM over the same period of time.

Sakic averages 3.4 on process and 3.3 on results across 63 moves, against Dorion’s 3.1 and 2.7. His results nearly match his process, where Dorion’s fell well short.

I’ve counted from summer 2014 through the 2022 Cup, though Patrick Roy shared control of personnel until August 2016. The average hides two very different GMs:

EraMovesProcessResults
2014–16 (with Roy)142.32.2
2016–22493.73.6

Scores below are process / result.

2014–15

  • Stastny lost to free agency: 2 / 2
  • Iginla at 37, 3 years x $5.33M: 2 / 3
  • Parenteau + 5th for Briere: 1 / 1
  • Brad Stuart trade + extension: 1 / 1
  • O’Reilly, 2 x $6M: 3 / 3
  • Barrie bridge deal: 4 / 4

2015–16

  • O’Reilly to Buffalo: 3 / 2
  • Soderberg, 5 x $4.75M: 2 / 3
  • Beauchemin at 35, 3 x $4.5M: 2 / 2
  • Comeau, 3 x $2.4M: 3 / 3
  • Erik Johnson, 7 x $6M: 3 / 3
  • Boedker rental: 2 / 1
  • Matthias rental: 2 / 2
  • Gelinas for a 3rd: 2 / 1

2016–17

  • MacKinnon, 7 x $6.3M: 5 / 5
  • Barrie, 4 x $5.5M: 4 / 4
  • Colborne, 2 x $2.5M: 3 / 1
  • Tyutin and Wiercioch, 1 year each: 3 / 2
  • Holding Duchene and Landeskog at the deadline: 4 / 5
  • Iginla to LA: 3 / 3
  • Andrighetto for Martinsen: 4 / 4
  • Barberio waiver claim: 4 / 3
  • Nieto waiver claim: 4 / 4

2017–18

  • Colin Wilson for a 4th: 3 / 2
  • Bernier, 1 year: 4 / 4
  • Yakupov, 1 year: 3 / 2
  • Zadorov, 2 years: 3 / 3
  • Kerfoot signed as college free agent: 5 / 4
  • Duchene trade: 5 / 5
  • Nemeth waiver claim: 4 / 4

2018–19

  • Grubauer trade + 3-year deal: 4 / 4
  • Ian Cole, 3 x $4.25M: 3 / 3
  • Calvert, 3 x $2.8M: 3 / 3
  • Brassard rental: 3 / 2

2019–20

  • Barrie + Kerfoot for Kadri: 4 / 5
  • Soderberg salary dump: 3 / 3
  • Burakovsky for a 2nd + 3rd: 5 / 5
  • Donskoi, 4 x $3.9M: 4 / 4
  • Bellemare, 2 years: 3 / 3
  • Nichushkin, 1 year at $850K: 5 / 5
  • Rantanen, 6 x $9.25M: 4 / 5
  • Compher, 4 x $3.5M: 3 / 3
  • Girard, 7 x $5M: 4 / 3
  • Francouz signing + extension: 4 / 3
  • Namestnikov rental: 3 / 3

2020–21

  • Toews for two 2nds, 4 x $4.1M: 5 / 5
  • Saad for Zadorov: 4 / 3
  • Burakovsky, 2 x $4.9M: 4 / 4
  • Graves, 3 years: 3 / 3
  • Nichushkin, 2 x $2.5M: 4 / 5
  • Dubnyk rental: 3 / 2
  • Nemeth and Soderberg depth rentals: 3 / 2

2021–22

  • Makar, 6 x $9M: 5 / 5
  • Landeskog, 8 x $7M: 3 / 2
  • Letting Grubauer walk: 3 / 5
  • Kuemper for Timmins, 1st + 3rd: 3 / 5
  • Graves to New Jersey: 4 / 3
  • Helm, 1 year: 3 / 4
  • MacDermid for a 4th: 2 / 2
  • Jost for Sturm: 3 / 3
  • Manson rental: 4 / 4
  • Lehkonen trade: 4 / 5
  • Cogliano for a 5th: 4 / 4

Early Sakic was worse than Dorion ever was, making the same mistake of paying for aging veterans. The difference is that he stopped: after 2016 he has only one move below a 3 on process, and his 5s came from buying undervalued players in their prime (Toews, Burakovsky, Nichushkin, Kadri).

Where Do the Ottawa Senators Go from Here? The Next Season, the Next Decade

Offseason Recap

In: William Eklund, Andre Burakovsky, Samuel Ersson

Out: Brady Tkachuk, Lars Eller, James Reimer 

I won’t relitigate it too much: Brady Tkachuk’s a good player, he’ll do well in Florida. His behavior was at times endearing and at times alienating. It would have cost a lot to keep him, perhaps more than you want to pay for a power-forward who plays on the wing who’s already started missing a lot of games to injury. And he handled his desire to leave about as well as could be expected. As a person who lived through the Dany Heatley trade request, this was a relatively tidy exit, and everyone seems ready to move on. Tkachuk was fun to have on the team, and he’ll be fun to root against. I commend everyone for mostly keeping their heads.

Ottawa General Manager Steve Staios did well to get three first round picks, including the ninth overall, and a second rounder for Tkachuk, given the complete lack of leverage he had, though the relative quality of the return is not equal in value to Tkachuk himself. 

Staios traded the ninth overall to the Sharks for William Eklund, the kind of player a fanbase get obsessive over when their team uses a top ten pick to select him but nobody else knows anything about. Accordingly, Sharks fans seem pretty heartbroken to part with him. Pierre McGuire floated on the Sick Podcast that Ottawa wanted Eklund in that year’s draft, that the Sharks had committed to not taking him and went back on it (whatever that means) and so Ottawa (infamously) took Tyler Boucher 10th overall. So it’s a player the organization has liked for a long time. He’s three years younger than Tkachuk, has draft pedigree (he was rated the top non-North American skater in the draft), and is on an affordable deal. And of course he’s good friends with team mascot Fabian Zetterlund. I’m excited to see what he can do.

I’m reminded that when Ottawa traded away Erik Karlsson, the return was roundly lambasted at the time as a massive loss for the franchise. Well, that return turned into Tim Stützle, and Josh Norris, who begat Dylan Cozens. There’s a line from a Kipling poem: If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster / And treat those two imposters just the same. You can win or lose a trade, but only fleetingly. It’s helpful to maintain perspective. Let’s see where both Tkachuk and Eklund are in five years. Tkachuk could be an aging forward, battling injuries, with an untradable boat anchor of a contract. Or he could win the Conn Smythe. Or both.

Given Florida traded Samoskevich to Seattle to make room for Tkachuk, I’m curious to know if he was ever floated as part of the return to Ottawa. He’s a promising young player with the same kind of grit Tkachuk provided, but it’s not the kind of thing that keeps me up at night. Maybe if Florida includes him, Ottawa doesn’t get the ninth overall, which means they don’t get Eklund, who seems to have a higher ceiling as a point scorer. I would have loved a scenario in which they get Samoskevich in lieu of one of those later first rounders, and still get the ninth/Eklund. Anyway, it will be interesting to compare the two players’ careers over time.

I don’t hate the Burakovsky trade as much as some. The team is looking for cheap scoring, which is a contradiction in terms. You only get it by taking a flyer on reclamation projects. They got a Cup-winning veteran who has shown he can score sometimes, on a relatively cheap deal, for a sixth round pick. He’s horrendous defensively, so you give him favorable zone starts and powerplay time and hope he can convert more than Tkachuk could on Stützle’s wing, or at least get the puck to Cozens, who sometimes seems like the only guy on the team who can score goals. If the goalscoring and playmaking works but his terrible qualities outweigh them, you pad his stats and he’s gone at the deadline for more than a sixth rounder – there’s always a market for a Cup-winning veteran on an expiring deal. Or he’s a disaster and all you’ve wasted is money. We’ll never know what else was on the table and what could have been instead of this deal, but seeing Mason Marchment get almost $7M per year and five years from the Sharks, I understand Staios not wanting to play in that sandbox.

Errson’s stats are terrible, but Staios basically said those stats don’t count because they intend to use him differently than he’s been used in other systems, and he’s deferring to his goaltending coach. I don’t know enough about goaltenders’ styles nor hockey systems to know if that kind of statement is ridiculous or another example of how publicly available statistics fall short. Either way, Ersson and Merilainen will have a chance to battle each other for a chance to provide what has recently been unattainable for Ottawa: league average goaltending.

The Short Term

The 2026-2027 season might be a rough one for the Ottawa Senators. Ottawa squeaked into the playoffs last year, although they were almost a 100 point team, the result of the Atlantic being an absolute bloodbath. Their playoff eligibility that season coincided with down years for Toronto, Florida, and Detroit. 

Well, according to the Athletic, Toronto is the 4th most improved team this offseason, and Florida the 6th most. So the Atlantic was tough, and it got tougher. Buffalo, Tampa, and Boston got worse, according to that Athletic article, and Buffalo is the least improved team in the league with the loss of Tuch and two middle-six defenders. Hapless Detroit somehow also got worse and that’s not even accounting for the potential loss of Dylan Larkin. But Ottawa is the second least improved team in the league. So if you’re looking for three teams in the Atlantic that could find themselves on the outside looking in, Detroit, Buffalo and Ottawa would be reasonable bets.

On the other hand, Linus Ullmark went from one of the worst goaltenders in the league in Goals Saved Above Expected during the regular season to one of the best in the playoffs. So who knows what the Senators produce with solid goaltending? And lest we forget that Tim Stützle is only 24 and Jake Sanderson only 23. The Senators could very well find themselves on the right side of the bubble again.

It’s worth noting that the top 10 of the 2027 draft class is projected to be seven of 10 centers. Top-line centers are so hard to find that Philadelphia just signed Leo Carlsson to an $18M/year offer sheet trying to get one. So, if there’s a year for Ottawa to take a step back and add a blue chip prospect, this might be it. The team could also jettison Amadio, Giroux, Burakovsky, and Foegele at the deadline, add the draft haul to the 2nd rounder they got from Florida in the Tkachuk trade, and restock their prospect pool. There are worse things than missing a year of the playoffs while keeping all of your core players. Ask Toronto, who took a year off and ended up with the first overall pick.

The Long Term

There’s a lot to like about the Ottawa Senators’ long-term position. If they re-sign Batherson at $10M, Kleven at $4M, Zub at $7M (all on the higher end of what they’re estimated to get), and trade or let all other UFAs over 30 walk, they’ll be sitting at ~$92.2M against a 2027-2028 $113.5M cap, or just shy of $21.5M in cap space with all core players locked up and only depth signings to consider. You want to bring Amadio, Foegele, and Giroux back for another lap? They’ll have the room to do it. Or they can be replaced, or they’ll have the space to swing big on a trade.

Every planet in the Ottawa Senators’ solar system revolves around the twin stars of Tim Stützle’s and Jake Sanderson’s contracts. I cannot overstate how big of a deal it is that those two are signed long-term at about $8M per year. In a league where Connor Bedard is already getting $15M and Leo Carlsson is getting $18M, Tim Stützle, who scored 90 points in his third season, and was better than a point-a-game last season and was a plus player, is making a little more than half of Bedard’s AAV. Sanderson is already getting Norris votes (he tied for ninth in voting) and he’s 23.

I was accused online of glazing Dorion’s legacy, but I’ll stick by what I actually said: Dorion signing these guys to these contracts is such a big deal that it almost nullifies the boneheaded stuff, of which there was a lot. If he’d signed them both to $5M X 4 bridge contracts, Senators fandom would be running around with its hair on fire right now about how we don’t have cap space to sign them both and might have to lose one. The Carlsson deal has changed the league; if he’s an $18M player, then what is Stützle, who has better numbers and better underlying stats?

It also means that Tim Stützle and Jake Sanderson are going to make $20M apiece in 2031-2032, right around the time Andlauer is going to be trying to finance a new arena’s construction. The team has to do everything it can to win in the next five years. There’s a lot of potential – the league will have a new television deal, and league expansion will result in more lucrative expansion fees for owners. But that’s probably going to result in an even higher cap and NBA-like contracts for the league’s best players, and Ottawa will be trying to keep two of them.

There’s less to be enthusiastic about when it comes to Ottawa’s prospect pool, which consists of Yakemchuk, a truly unique defensive prospect who electrified at times when he debuted last season but on the whole got caved in, and a collection of toolsy depth who are years away. The farm team could really benefit from another blue-chipper or two. 

The Bottom Line

I’m imploring everyone not to overreact if the Senators take a step back next season. Their core is locked up long-term on team-friendly deals. Boston, Tampa, and Florida are all aging, trying to win one more Cup before entering the waning years of their contending window. Buffalo, Toronto, and Detroit are intriguing mixes of young talent, bloated contracts, and big question marks. Montreal is really the only team in the division that seems to be both just entering its peak years and with an airtight cap sheet.

If the question is, “Who is your pick going into next season?” Ottawa might not be at the top of your list. But if you could only pick one team in the Atlantic to compete with for the next decade, for me it comes down to Ottawa and Montreal. It will be important to keep that in mind when we hit the do-or-die days of March 2027, no matter where Ottawa finds itself in the standings.